

**The Global War on Terrorism
Operation Iraq Freedom**

**733RD MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
(CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION)
(TACTICAL SUPPORT ELEMENT)**

**(Fort Gillem, Georgia)
March 2003 – January 2004**



**Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia**

The Global War on Terrorism Operation Iraqi Freedom

**733RD MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
(CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION)
(TACTICAL SUPPORT ELEMENT)**

**(Fort Gillem, Georgia)
March 2003 – January 2004**

**Dennis M. Hatcher
Kathryn Roe Coker**



**Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia
2008**



DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (US Army Institute of Heraldry.)

First Printed 2008
OCH PUB 4-7

Copies obtained from the Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)

Foreword

The Global War on Terrorism-Operation Iraqi Freedom: 733rd Military Police Battalion (Criminal Investigation Division) (Tactical Support Element) is one in a series of histories of Army Reserve units deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This includes Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The histories are based on primary sources collected by the Office of Army Reserve History's GWOT Military History Task Force. The task force provides program management, central collection, and archiving of unit histories. The former Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General James Helmly, stated the importance of this collection effort:

The Army Reserve is experiencing a time of great transition to meet present and future challenges to our national security. The events of this transition, while still fresh, must be captured and documented to preserve the story of the Army Reserve's contribution to this unprecedented war. The result will be a unique archive of the wartime accomplishments of all mobilized Army Reserve units, not only of this war, but for all future defense commitments. Nowhere else within the United States Government does an official archive of the Army Reserve exist.

The records collected include narratives with a mission statement, after action reviews or lessons learned, personnel rosters, mobilization orders, demobilization orders, unit briefing slides, photographs, and autobiographical sketches. This information is used to record and to preserve the Army Reserve's contributions to GWOT. This volume and other unit histories included in the series, as compiled from these records, provide an invaluable resource for the Army Reserve and its Soldiers to

learn from their own experiences and retain lessons learned for future operations.

Fort McPherson
Atlanta, Georgia
August 2008

LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.
Army Reserve Historian
United States Army Reserve

Introduction

"Through their service, Reserve personnel play an important role in our efforts to advance democracy, peace and freedom across the Nation and around the world. These dedicated men and women train vigorously and work closely with our active duty forces, serving as equal partners in our integrated Armed Forces." President George W. Bush (11 August 2002)¹

11 September 2001 was a watershed in the history of the United States. The terrorist attacks had a profound affect on the country. In his address to the nation that night, President George W. Bush said the attacks had moved "a great people . . . to defend a great nation." Bush set the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the US "will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." On 20 September 2001 in a joint session of Congress, Bush further defined his policy by stating, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."²

On 15 September, Bush ordered a partial mobilization of reserve forces with the first call-ups starting on 22 September. The Army Reserve quickly reacted to the largest deployment since Operation Desert Storm. Even before the official call-ups, eighty-five Soldiers from one Army Reserve unit, the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs), were on the scene at the Pentagon by 17 September 2001.³

In New York after the attack on the World Trade Center, Army Reserve Soldiers aided in the recovery efforts. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers were quick to answer the call for assistance. Army Reserve Soldiers provided equipment, reserve center space, and other logistical support. Like the Pentagon recovery effort the actions of Army Reserve Soldiers at the World Trade Center preceded official mobilization.⁴

Military intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden's Islamic al Qaeda was responsible for the 11 September attacks. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan where the fundamentalist Taliban regime

controlled the country and harbored al Qaeda. A loose coalition, the Northern Alliance, opposed the Taliban. On 7 October 2001, less than a month after the 11 September attacks, the US, with support from Great Britain, launched an air and naval attack as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The campaign pinpointed airfields and air defenses along with command and control centers. In a national address Bush said the military action was aimed to "cut the military capability of the Taliban regime." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that the assault was intended to "make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base of operations."⁵

The ground war or "boots on the ground" began on 19 October 2001 with a number of twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment A teams who joined the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. By November 2001 over 50,000 American forces involving ground, sea, and air operations were in the theater. "The fighting in Afghanistan," wrote Brigadier General John Brown, director of the US Army Center of Military History, "fractured into several miniature campaigns as each allied Afghan warlord advanced on his own objectives, carefully protecting the tiny contingent of Americans who gave him . . . awesome firepower."⁶ The fall of Kabul and Kandahar and the "destruction of organized resistance in Tora Bora" spelled doom for the terrorists. By late 2001, American Soldiers working with Afghan forces were successful in "decisive[l]y defeating the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies and in liberating Afghanistan."⁷ Operation Enduring Freedom "marked the first commitment of American forces in what would become simultaneous combat operations across multiple theaters of war since World War II."⁸

In his state of the union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush told the American people "in four short months," the country had "rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression."⁹

But, as seen later the terrorists rallied, albeit in a weakened state. By January 2002, the US and its allies began to set the stage for Operation

Anaconda which lasted from 2 March through 19 March 2002. Its mission was to destroy remaining al Qaeda forces. Although the operation was successful, a number of al Qaeda fled into the nearby mountains and into Pakistan. While the terrorists suffered substantial losses, fighting still persists in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Operation Enduring Freedom continues as does the mobilization of Army Reserve Soldiers.

The Army Reserve played and is playing a vital role in these operations. According to Lieutenant General James Helmly, then Chief, Army Reserve, "What was once a force in reserve has become a full partner across the spectrum of operations to satisfy the demand and need for Army Reserve Soldiers and units around the world. Wherever the Army committed forces in the world . . . Army Reserve Soldiers are an integral part, providing critical specialized capabilities and augmentation."¹¹

Army Reserve Soldiers were there in Afghanistan serving alongside active component Soldiers. For example, the 911th Forward Surgical Team supported the 10th Mountain Division during medical assistance missions in Afghanistan. The 310th Psychological Operations Battalion served in the isolated mountain regions of Afghanistan determining the needs of the people and organizing the delivery of non-perishable food, bottled water, and medical aid.¹² The 345th Military Intelligence Detachment assisted the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in intelligence operations leading to the identification, location and targeting of the Taliban and al Qaeda. What Army Reserve Soldiers accomplished proved "vital to the war on terrorism." "We," said one Soldier, "helped out the active duty forces that were there and needed the augmentation." Some civil affairs units, known for their distribution of humanitarian aid and assisting in rebuilding projects, found themselves on the front lines working on combat operations with the infantrymen.¹³ In fighting terrorists there often was no clearly defined front line.

The concept for what later became Operation Iraqi Freedom was long in the making dating back some viewed to 1 March 1991, the day after Desert Storm. Based on intelligence that Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction President Bush decided that a regime change

in Iraq was warranted. He also based his decision on Iraq's probable connection with terrorists and the belief that Iraq posed a danger to the stability of the Middle East. As some of America's allies questioned the threat of Saddam, Bush was prepared to act alone to crush what he included in his "axis of evil." Others wanted to wait on the results of recently readmitted UN weapons inspectors. Britain sided with Bush as his determination for a regime change in Iraq increased.¹⁴ In a statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 2002, Bush said:

My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.¹⁵

Seven days later on 17 September 2002, Bush released his administration's National Security Strategy which, in short, set forth the reformulation and posture of America's foreign policy. It was a major shift from a "'shape, respond, prepare'" posture to the new posture of "'assure, dissuade, deter forward, and decisively defeat.'" It affected how the Army was to reshape itself and went hand in hand with the Army's ongoing transformation. The new posture included preemption to handle rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. As Bush said, this was "a matter of common sense and self defense."¹⁶ It would set the stage in 2003 for the invasion of Iraq.

When Bush made this address to the UN plans were already in the making for a campaign against Iraq. In fact on 4 December 2001 General Tommy Franks, commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM),

briefed the secretary of defense on the first draft war plan. By 1 February 2002, Franks had plans for a four-phased war involving deployment of troops into theater, air strikes, a ground war, and reconstruction.¹⁷

On the eve of the campaign, the Turkish parliament decided not to allow the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to pass through the country and thereby set up a front in northern Iraq. "This obviated a major feature of the preferred war plan, left the division's equipment out of play as it hastily transshipped from standing offshore from Turkey to Kuwait, and perturbed deployment schedules because the ships carrying the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division equipment were not available for other purposes for a prolonged period of time."

Franks and the ground forces commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, had to reassess their strategy in the light of the impending conflict. Franks had several contingency plans. One called for a "rolling start." According to this plan, the campaign would begin by using forces already in theater and supplementing them as needed with "reinforcements as they arrived. Iraqi dispositions and circumstances," wrote Brown, "did not suggest significant resistance much south of Baghdad, so why not sweep up relatively uncontested terrain with a lesser force and feed in further forces as they arrived?"¹⁸ The plan was tactically driven given a twelve-year air campaign dating from Desert Storm with the no fly zones, American ground forces "acclimatized for operations in Iraq" with experienced defensive operations protecting Kuwait, and intelligence reportedly pinpointing Saddam's location.¹⁹

Operation Iraqi Freedom began with an air assault on 19 March 2003 in the "shock and awe" phase. Within twenty-four hours the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division, and the British 7th Armored Division were on the move. They quickly traversed the theater without much opposition, moving along the west side of the Euphrates River toward Baghdad, reaching the vicinity of Al Najaf with minimal resistance, overrunning the Rumaila oil fields and securing the facilities "virtually unscathed," capturing Umm Qasr and mounting other offensive operations. Western and northern Iraq had virtually been neutralized.²⁰

However, "the campaign did not stay easy." The Fedayeen, special Republican Guards, and other forces mounted a counterattack "with a vengeance." They proved to be "wily and ruthless opponents," ambushing US forces, sniping, attacking the extended supply lines, firing shoulder air defense weapons, and using suicidal tactics. "They knew the American rules of engagement and exploited them to their advantage." An Nasiriyah was one of the most "hotly contested" areas. The expected moral support from the Iraqi Shiites did not materialize as they "seemed to present an overall attitude of sullen indifference." Lieutenant General William Wallace, the V Corps commander, responded to the "troubling surprises" when he remarked that the Iraqis were "'not the enemy we war-gamed against.'" Strategy and tactics had to change to combat the "dynamic battlefield."

The Army Reserve responded by mobilizing primarily combat service and combat service support units. Army Reserve Soldiers were involved in providing military police protection, operating ports and ammunition facilities, repairing equipment, building bridges, hauling fuel, and supporting the theater on a broad-spectrum.²¹ Army Reserve units like the 733 Military Police Battalion (Criminal Investigation Division) (Tactical Support Element) received mobilization orders and deployed to Kuwait and then to Iraq.

By the end of 2003, the Army Reserve had mobilized a total of 2,322 units (AA UIC's and derivative UIC's).²² The total number of Army Reserve Soldiers serving on active duty for the Global War on Terrorism was 71,587 incorporating Operations Noble Eagle (home front), Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.²³ Helmly described the mobilization as "for percentage wise the largest mobilization we've had since World War II."²⁴ In a message to Army Reserve Soldiers and their families, Helmly told them: "Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service, we are being called upon to sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism."²⁵ "The nation has called," said Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, the current Chief, Army

Reserve, “so we’ve answered the call, and we’re going to continue to answer the call.”²⁶

Major combat operations in Iraq officially ended on 1 May 2003 when President Bush declared "mission accomplished."²⁷ However, as with Operation Enduring Freedom, the insurgents were relentless. The Global War on Terrorism continued with the nonstop mobilization and deployment of Army Reserve Soldiers. The Army Reserve remained committed to the warfight and to the warrior ethos. For the 733rd Military Police Battalion (Criminal Investigation Division) (Tactical Support Element) that meant identifying war crimes, war crime sites and crimes against humanity; conducting investigations; and providing military felony investigations.

Lineage and Honors

First activated on 22 January 1968 at Jackson, Mississippi

Moved to Fort Gillem, Georgia, in January 2003.

Received Meritorious Unit Commendation for service in Central and Southwest Asia during 2003-2004.²⁸

Heraldry

US Army Criminal Investigation Command



Crest

The central star symbolizes centralized command. The grid lines allude to the latitude and the longitude lines of the globe, thus referring to the worldwide activities of the organization. The grid lines also suggest a stylized web, with eight sides representing the original eight geographical regions of the command. The web, a symbol of criminal apprehension, is the result of methodical construction alluding to the scientific methods of criminal investigations. The outer points of the star further symbolize far reaching authority. Red, white and blue, are the national colors and gold is symbolic of achievement.



Shoulder Sleeve Insignia

The central star and the lines of latitude and longitude suggesting a globe, together with the arrowheads marking the points of a compass, symbolize the basic worldwide mission of the command: to perform and exercise centralized command authority, direction, and control of Army criminal investigation activities worldwide. Red, white and blue are the national colors.²⁹

Heraldry

733RD MILITARY POLICE BATTALION



Distinctive Unit Insignia

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches (2.86 cm) in height overall, consisting of a shield blazoned: Vert, a bend Or charged with a mace Sable interlaced with three bendlets sinister Argent, the center bendlet sinister surmounting the bend; attached above and below the shield, two black scrolls doubled gold inscribed "VIRTUS INTEGRITAS" at top and "VERITAS" at bottom.

Symbolism: Green and yellow are the colors traditionally used by the Military Police. The mace is the symbol of authority and conveys the strength and ability to enforce the law. The bendlets symbolize the qualities emphasized by the motto, "Virtus, Integritas, Veritas," which translates to "Courage, Integrity, Truth." Black symbolizes strength, white denotes high ideals. Gold represents excellence.

Background: The distinctive unit insignia was approved on 23 November 1999.



Coat of Arms

Blazon:

Shield: Vert, a bend Or charged with a mace Sable interlaced with three bendlets sinister Argent, the center bendlet sinister surmounting the bend.

Crest: That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Army Reserve: From a wreath Or and Vert, the Lexington Minute Man Proper. The statue of the Minute Man, Captain John Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the common in Lexington, Massachusetts.

Motto: VIRTUS, INTEGRITAS, VERITAS.

Symbolism:

Shield: Green and gold represent the Military Police branch. The mace is a symbol of authority and conveys the strength and ability to enforce the law. The bendlets symbolize the qualities emphasized by the motto "Virtus, Integritas, Veritas," which translate to "Courage, Integrity, Truth." Black symbolizes strength, white denotes high ideals. Gold represents excellence.

Crest: The crest is that of the U.S. Army Reserve.

Background: The coat of arms was approved on 23 November 1999.³⁰

Chronology

- 10 September 2002 Seven Soldiers of the 234th Military Police (MP) Detachment, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), 733rd MP Battalion, mobilized and attached to the 701st MP Group (CID) Protective Service Unit at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.³¹
- 13 September 2003 Soldiers arrived at Fort Belvoir, Virginia
- 15 March 2003 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 733rd MP, unit identification code (UIC) WQ7GAA, mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.³²
- 17 March 2003 HHD was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia, for follow on deployment to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.³³
- 18-31 March 2003 Unit completed mobilization training.
- 8 April 2003 Unit received deployment validation.³⁴
- 15 April 2003 733rd commander and command sergeant major visited detachments at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
- 19 April 2003 Unit departed Fort Benning, en route to Kuwait.
- 20 April 2003 733rd arrived at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
- 15 May 2003 Unit assigned to Camp Arifjan and assumed responsibility for its area of operations; took command of one Army Reserve and three active Army detachments.

7 June 2003	Unit's equipment arrived in Kuwait.
17 August 2003	Detachment of seven Soldiers from the 234th MP Detachment departed Fort Belvoir, en route to Fort Benning for demobilization.
20 August 2003	234th MP Detachment demobilized at Fort Benning.
15 November 2003	Headquarters Detachment departed Camp Arifjan.
17 November 2003	Headquarters Detachment arrived at Fort Benning to begin reintegration processing.
22 November 2003	Unit personnel began terminal leave.
15 January 2004	Headquarters Detachment was officially demobilized at Fort Gillem, Georgia. ³⁵

Operations

Mobilization

The 733rd Military Police (MP) Battalion, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Theater Support Element, hereafter known simply as the 733rd, is unique: it is the only Army Reserve MP CID battalion headquarters ever mobilized and deployed.³⁶ The 733rd is now based in Forest Park, Georgia, home to Fort Gillem, and is a subordinate unit of the Criminal Investigation Command, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The 733rd's designation as an MP unit is somewhat misleading, for it would be a mistake to assume the unit's mission mirrors that of a regular military police unit. Because of its designation as a CID organization, its mission deals only with the investigation of criminal activity. The keyword is investigation; unlike regular military police, CID agents do not have the authority to prefer charges against anyone. That is the responsibility of the commander to which the CID unit supports. Rather, the CID searches out the full facts of a situation, organizes the facts into a logical summary of investigative data, and presents this data to the responsible command or to a United States attorney, as appropriate. Ultimately, the commander of the US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command answers only to the chief of staff of the Army and the secretary of the Army.³⁷ This distinct autonomy was not an arbitrary decision or an organizational oversight; it was a deliberate design to free CID agents from the threat of command influence upon any investigation. This is similar to the autonomy required of military judges to prevent bias against an accused Soldier in a military court.

The 733rd headquarters, located in Jackson, Mississippi, at the time, was in the process of relocating to Fort Gillem, Georgia. Commanded by then-Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Russell, the headquarters mobilized on 15 March 2003 at Fort Gillem, specifically for the purpose of investigating suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters of operations. This was not the only mobilization within the 733rd.

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Seven months earlier, on 10 September 2002, seven Soldiers—six Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers and one Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Soldier from the 234th MP Detachment of the 733rd—mobilized as individual US Army criminal investigators and assigned to augment the 701st Military Police Group (CID), Protective Service Unit (PSU), an active Army unit at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.³⁸ Its mission was to provide protective services for the secretary and deputy secretary of Defense; the secretary of the Army; the chairman and vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; and chief and vice chief of staff of the Army. Each investigator planned and executed threat assessments and on-site advance security operations in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Protection included, but was not limited to, motorcade security; route and residence security; and close-in protection of officials which ensured their safety from physical harm or embarrassment. Whenever these dignitaries traveled anywhere, the protective unit was there ahead of them, in such places as Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Germany, Great Britain and the Balkans.³⁹

This small detachment of seven distinguished themselves throughout their tour of duty, earning many personal accolades. But those accolades were earned the hard way, according to the writer of that detachment's historical narrative. "733rd members had to overcome the stigma applied to being a reservist," wrote the unidentified author. "The end of [our] tour left no questions in the minds of active duty personnel that reservists could accomplish the mission by the same [standards] or beyond those of active duty [Soldiers]. In numerous cases the expertise and skill of the reserve members surpassed that of their active duty counterparts."⁴⁰

These Soldiers, though not forgotten by the 733rd, integrated completely into the 701st and were not affected by the concurrent mobilization of their home unit's headquarters and detachments in March 2003. Another detachment under the command of the 733rd, the 378th MP Detachment (CID), would later join this mission and bring even greater honor when one of its Soldiers, Master Sergeant Larry Congleton, served as the personal security officer to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from April 2003 to November 2004. That same Soldier also won the CID

Command's prestigious award as Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Special Agent of the Year, in 2003.

Fort Benning, Georgia

The headquarters detachment, or HHD, mobilized at Fort Benning from its new home station on Fort Gillem, just a few miles southeast of Atlanta, Georgia. The 733rd's detachments⁴¹ consisted of four detachments of thirty-five personnel each: the 234th MP (CID) stayed in Jackson, Mississippi; the 307th MP (CID) was from Jacksonville, Florida; the 378th MP (CID) was from Louisville, Kentucky; and the 383rd MP (CID) was from Lakeland, Florida. They each reported to the mobilization station at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The powers in control of mobilizing units decided the headquarters should train for mobilization at Fort Benning while the others trained at Fort Campbell. Russell attempted to keep his battalion together and vigorously protested the separation, but his arguments fell on deaf ears. "I did manage to visit them up at Campbell," Russell said. "A friend of mine was up there and he made sure my detachments were cared for."⁴² Immediately thereafter began ten days of deployment validation training focused on basic Soldier skills, such as the M-16 rifle and the 9 millimeter automatic pistol marksmanship, combat first aid, care and use of the M40 protective mask, land mine awareness, response to depleted uranium, and many more subjects.⁴³ While there, CID agents assigned from other units augmented, or "plussed up" Russell's headquarters, which now totaled approximately forty-five Soldiers, and was actually at over strength. During the training cycle, 3rd CID Group headquarters discovered the HHD commander was an intelligence specialty officer whose skills were urgently needed in Kuwait and sent him to Kuwait as the advance party. One of his missions would be to ensure the HHD's smooth and quick transition into the country.

Kuwait

On 19 April 2003, the battalion headquarters departed Fort Benning by chartered tour bus for the ninety mile trip to Maxwell Air Force Base, located on the outskirts of Montgomery, Alabama. At approximately 1800

hours (6:00 pm), the detachment boarded a chartered Delta Airlines plane that would take them to Kuwait. As the senior ranking officer aboard, Russell was in charge of Soldiers from other units also aboard the craft. By 1900 hours (7:00 pm) the fully-loaded plane took off on a non-stop flight to Vicenza, Italy, home of the Southern European Task Force, landing there in the late afternoon hours of 20 April. After refueling and obtaining military clearance for a flight over hostile territory, the plane took off once again, arriving at Kuwait International Airport at just around 2200 hours (10:00 pm). The Soldiers deplaned at the civilian airline terminal. From there, they boarded a shuttle bus that took them on a short ride to Camp Wolf, the US-operated processing station for all incoming and outgoing Soldiers. Camp Wolf occupied a section of land separating the two main runways of Kuwait International Airport, which made it convenient for moving Soldiers in and out of the theater quickly. "Camp Wolf was a circus," Russell declared, referring to the non-stop activity taking place there.⁴⁴ A combat support hospital located at the camp made medical evacuation of injured Soldiers more efficient than in past wars.⁴⁵

Because the former HHD commander arrived in Kuwait approximately three weeks ahead of the 733rd and made the necessary arrangements, Russell and his Soldiers spent only two hours at Camp Wolf, just long enough to claim their personal gear, ammunition and other supplies from the plane and load onto a bus shortly after midnight, en route to their new home at Camp Arifjan. The bus's windows had security or "blackout" curtains that were now pulled shut, reducing the chances of being seen and attacked from the outside. At that time, Kuwait was considered a "hot zone," meaning there was a potential for armed attacks against coalition forces. Russell's men, who carried empty weapons since leaving Fort Benning, were nervous about making a bus trip without loaded weapons to defend themselves. In the darkness came the sound of ammo boxes being torn open and rifle and pistol magazines being loaded in the subdued light of red-lensed flashlights. Soldiers in the rear of the bus loaded magazines and passed them forward until everyone's weapon was now ready to return fire in the case of attack.

When the weary Soldiers at last reached Camp Arifjan, they found the place in disarray, but it was for good reason. The camp, which had been designed to accommodate only about 2,000 permanently assigned Soldiers and was still under construction, now was swollen with over 20,000 human beings living in near conditions as every inch of free space became occupied. During the day the heat was stifling and constant sandstorms made life nearly unbearable. With time, Arifjan would become a hospitable and even welcome place. But right now, it was hell on earth for most of the hapless Soldiers who waited there, sometimes for weeks, until their equipment arrived at the port and they could move on into Iraq. For Russell's men, their unit's equipment did not arrive in port until 7 June; they were lucky, because they did not have to wait until then to begin their mission. A previous CID unit, which departed some weeks before, left its equipment in place, stored by the 3rd CID Group for the use of the 733rd. Equipped with approximately ten HMMWV's,⁴⁶ tents and electric generators, Russell was close to taking over his unit's area of operations.⁴⁷

Crimes Against Humanity

Approximately one week after the arrival of the HHD, the first of Russell's other detachments, the 307th, arrived only to immediately transfer to the 10th CID Battalion under order of the 3rd CID Group. Approximately another week later the 383rd arrived and quickly began operations at Camp Babylon. By the middle of May when Russell officially assumed responsibility for the 733rd's area of operations, he gained command of an active Army unit from Fort Lewis, Washington, the 44th CID which was then at Arifjan; the 12th CID Detachment at Camp Bucca, Iraq; and seventeen other Soldiers from the CID Kuwait Branch Office, at Camp Doha, Kuwait. In the end, the 733rd's operational strength numbered approximately 120 Soldiers. The mission of the battalion centered on identification of war crimes and war crime sites along with crimes against humanity, and conducting investigations sufficient to determine their probability and extent for other agencies and governments to evaluate. The battalion also provided military felony investigations. The battalion's area of responsibility encompassed the

entirety of Kuwait and southern Iraq to a line northward bordering the southern city limits of Baghdad. The battalion also provided agents to augment the Kandahar, Afghanistan CID office.⁴⁸

While the search for weapons of mass destruction was underway by other government agency investigators, the 733rd endeavored to uncover mass graves. “We were the War Crimes unit,” said Russell . . . “[W]e were directed by Colin Powell, the Secretary of State himself, to look for mass graves and suspected war crimes.”⁴⁹

Agents from the HHD and the 44th MP Detachment gathered war crime intelligence through the detainee center at Camp Bucca, Umm Qasr, located in the southeast section of Iraq, just a few miles north of the Kuwait border, and used that intelligence to investigate reports of atrocities committed during the Shiite uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1992. A task force consisting of a twelve-man CID team accompanied by a forensic pathologist, engineers with earth digging equipment, and chemical and ordnance personnel would converge on a reported mass grave site. Interpreters would canvass the local town asking residents for information that would lead the team to a probable location. The first step was to bring in the engineers’ ditch digging machine to begin uncovering several feet of earth and sand. The criterion for categorizing a mass grave was simple: if three or more human remains were uncovered, the site was declared a mass grave. When remains were found, the next step was to determine the direction of the grave and lay out a grid network to systematically uncover the area. “In all, we [the 733rd] uncovered the remains of 300,000 Shiites at twenty-nine sites,” Russell explained. “Most of the remains were skeletalized, but some clothing and tissue remained. Many still had their hands bound behind their backs.”⁵⁰ After completing the task of uncovering the site and confirming that a war crime had taken place, the job of the CID was finished. It was up to the Iraqi police to secure the area, and during these times, the Coalition Provisional Authority of Lewis Paul Bremer, to determine the outcome. Typically, authorities attempted to identify the bodies and notify the next of kin. In many cases, positive identification could take months and even years to ascertain.

Other investigations involved the 733rd as well, to include the case of missing Soldier Private First Class Jessica Lynch, who was later discovered badly injured but alive after having been held captive by Iraqi forces for ten days. Her capture and rescue took place the month before the 733rd's arrival, but the investigation into the circumstances surrounding her unit's ambush and subsequent fate of her fellow Soldiers in captivity, continued long after. By early August 2003, the 733rd logged more than 174 reports of investigation against US Soldiers; more than 100 felony complaints and thirty were in-theater deaths.

Mission Accomplished

By November 2003, the 733rd's mobilization was rapidly coming to an end. In the months immediately following the Iraqi surrender, US Soldiers redeployed in huge numbers, creating a corresponding drop in the number of CID investigations. "There was always enough investigations to keep us busy," explained Command Sergeant Major Wade Gordon III, "but as far as the war crime and mass grave investigations, there were always someone there digging. There were always felony investigations, things like fraud at the PX, theft of supplies, misappropriation and theft of government property--things that CID normally investigates in a combat theater."⁵¹ The mission load transferred to the active Army CID detachments still in theater at Camp Doha. The 733rd Soldiers began to pack their equipment to leave, not that there was much to pack. They washed the desert dust and sand from their vehicles and put them into storage for future units to use. By the time they got word to depart Arifjan for Camp Wolf on 15 November, the Soldiers of the HHD had only their personal gear and weapons to throw aboard the bus that took them to Camp Wolf. The stay at Camp Wolf was a little longer than when they arrived nearly eight months earlier: this time it took about five hours to process them, get them through customs, and into the holding area. Once aboard the commercial airliner, all anyone could think of was being home before Thanksgiving and especially, Christmas. "As I recall," Gordon remembered, "the plane made several stops in the US to drop off Soldiers along the way. When we got back to Fort Benning, the Commander and I

made plans to fly to Fort Campbell to greet the detachments. We flew out of Columbus and got there in time to greet them. They were leather-bent to get out of there and go on leave, but I think we all had dinner together.”⁵² They returned the next day to Fort Benning to begin out-processing and reintegration, a mandatory period of briefings on military benefits and a chance to readjust to a culture without sand, dust, and mass graves.

Some 733rd Soldiers, reorganized into very small detachments of one and two people, stayed on in Kuwait and would return at various times during the coming year, the last returning in September 2004. For most, it had been an exciting mission, but one not without its frustrations. It was also an experience that brought personal satisfaction and honor that might otherwise never be gotten.

Lieutenant Colonel Russell and his detachments finished their reintegration and began their leave in time for the holidays with loved ones, family and friends. On 15 January 2004, the 733rd Headquarters Detachment officially demobilized at Fort Gillem, Georgia, its new home station.⁵³

Lessons Learned

Russell identified a number of lessons learned in his after action report to the commander of the 3d Military Police Group. Mobilization was one operational issue. There was confusion in understanding that “CID units mobilize either as an entire UIC or as a derivative UIC and if the entire UIC is mobilized then everyone has to be mobilized.” Army Reserve CID units should be given a chance to participate in the mobilization planning process and to influence the elements mobilized and to which mobilization station they are assigned.

The headquarters and detachments “were raped to provide agents and support personnel to the War Crimes Investigation Team and the Group staff. . . .” When feasible, unit integrity should be maintained. To activate an entire unit and then break up the leadership is unsound.

Russell recommended that a plan be in place regarding the handling of secret and top secret records before arrival in theater. While Army regulations address these issues, consideration needs to be given to executing the regulatory requirements.

The 383rd commander and the 307th commander were pulled from their unit to serve as the battalion S4 and the S1, respectively. “In a deployed environment,” wrote Russell, “CID detachments need a captain to command the unit allowing warrants to be technical experts.” Russell recommended changing the new MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) to reflect the old MTOE’s requirement for an O-3 commander who can better handle leadership and deployment issues rather than performing staff officer functions which could be handled by NCOs.

Russell recognized force flow, the flow of tactical elements to the theater of operations, to be an issue. “This deployment should be based on the footprint of the deployed units and the doctrinal requirements of CID.” But, the CID force flow in this deployment apparently did not follow the ground forces “at least in a timely manner.” He opined that force flow should occur early in a major deployment. The CID should deploy its “tactical and doctrinally correct units commensurate with the size of the deployed units in the AOR. These initial CID elements, whatever their C2

[command and control] size, must plan and coordinate all aspects of potential missions. Non typical missions like mass grave exploitation must be planned early on with supported Corps and Theater elements.”

War crimes investigative coordination was problematic. Coordination simply did not occur at every level. Russell stated that the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command “must be involved early on during a major deployment in planning the deliberate and organized effort of exploiting sensitive sites. This can only be accomplished by Theater level staff coordination. Without this degree of coordination the supporting security; EOD [explosive ordnance disposal]; NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical]; and engineer elements are not readily available.”

The Criminal Investigations Task Force was the Department of Defense component charged with the war crimes investigative effort. Yet its presence was “limited,” evidently “overwhelmed by the intelligence gathering and analysis requirements of the 3d MP GRP’s [Groups]” War Crimes Investigative Team. Russell recommended that the team “should be the agency tasked with coordinating and planning at the Theater level for sensitive site exploitation with augmentation” from the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command and other services’ mobile exploitation teams.

There was an issue with tactical sustainment. The battalion’s most forward deployed unit, the 383d, was in the midst of a significant “transition as the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force transferred authority to coalition elements and the US presence in the Southern AOR lessened significantly.” This left the unit without its base of support. It did manage to acquire support from a reserve component at Talil Air Force Base. But “these relationships” may not always be present. There should be planned tactical sustainment for units in theater.

Another lesson learned concerned TDY settlements. Since the headquarters and detachments were mobilized at different stations, there were Soldiers who needed TDY travel between the stations. There was confusion on how to submit a mobilized Army Reserve’s Soldier’s travel voucher. As a result, many of the TDY settlements were not paid until late in the deployment. Russell recommended that the active component

CID element work closely with the reserve component unit's full time support staff to ensure all of its unique and specific needs are met. An assumption should not be made that things like travel vouchers are processed the same for active component Soldiers as they are for mobilized reserve component Soldiers.

Russell recognized several supply issues. The battalion and its detachments did not have any operational TDA (table of distribution and allowance) equipment before mobilization. Items such as date crime scene kits and laptop computers are "absolutely essential but are not authorized on the MTOE." Consequently, the battalion's supporting reserve command (81st Regional Readiness Group) is not required to fund the items. The 3d MP Group did purchase some ninety percent of the requested supplies. Russell recommended that the CID "consider funding these items prior to a deployment for all Reserve CID units." CID battalions need major MTOE and TDA changes to guarantee the availability of operational equipment in theater.

Russell opined that Soldiers deploying prior to their equipment negatively impacts the unit's ability to be operational upon arrival in theater. While this may be necessary in establishing operations in theater, Russell believed it should not occur with follow on elements.

Another supply issue concerned the regulatory requirement to close government purchase cards upon mobilization. This policy, he suggested, should be re-examined to facilitate the quick purchase of needed equipment.

Russell concluded his after action report by writing:

There are many systemic problems identified. This is not unusual since CID does not typically deploy such a large element and has never deployed a Reserve Battalion HQs. Some of these issues do not have a quick fix and very likely will exist during subsequent deployments. In an effort to mitigate many of these lessons learned, it is recommended that CID involve the Reserve Component BN HQs early in the planning process This may help combat against

some of the systemic problems. At a minimum, these issues can be addressed early in the planning process.⁵⁴

From A Soldier's Perspective

“We were put up in small tents at Arifjan and living conditions were pretty rough, but we started missions work almost immediately.”⁵⁵

“... our job [crime scene investigation] wasn't always as neat as on TV.”⁵⁶

“We had some great people over there.”⁵⁷

Photographs



Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Russell (second from right), commander, 733rd Military Police Battalion (Criminal Investigation Division) and Headquarters Detachment Soldiers "stacking and packing" at Kelly Hill, Fort Benning, Georgia, prior to deployment, April 2003.



The headquarters of the 733rd Military Police Battalion, co-located with the post headquarters at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, May 2003.



Lieutenant Colonel Russell with a 733rd convoy security detachment from a supporting military police company. Photo taken at Uday Hussein's (Saddam's eldest son) palace in Babylon, Iraq, 2003.



The flash of the camera catches a still life image amidst a swirling sand storm at Camp Bucca, Iraq, 2003.



Left to right: Specialist Silvestre D. Manuel, Sergeant Aaron M. Alley, Iraqi guide Fatima, Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Russell, and Command Sergeant Major Wade F. Gordon III pose in front of the Lion of Babylon ruin, Babylon, Iraq, 2003.



Awards formation for the 733rd Military Police Battalion (Criminal Investigation Division) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, close to the end of their deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom, November 2003.

NOTES

¹ Article, "Notable Quotables," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 6.

² Statement, President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11 Sep 01,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

³ Testimony, Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, "Army Reserve Overview," Statement Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 13 Feb 02; Article, Linda Kozaryn, "Army Reserve Duty Has 'Changed Forever,'" 22 Jan 02, <https://isarcintra/CdrsCorner/ArmyResDutymsg.htm>; and Email, Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner with attached article, Gina Cavallaro, *Times* "Army Reserve deploys greater percentage of soldiers," 19 Mar 03.

⁴ Testimony, Statement of Lieutenant General James Helmly Before the Subcommittee On Defense, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, National Guard and Reserve Programs, 7 May 03.

⁵ Coordinating Draft, Brigadier General John S. Brown, *American Military History* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 26 Nov 03), chapter 29, p. 8; Pamphlet, Dr. Richard Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, no date), p. 7; Article, author unknown, "Afghanistan wakes after night of intense bombings," 7 Oct

2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/gen.america.under_attack/index.tml; and Article, author unknown, no date, "Defense officials Air Operations to last several days," <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.attack.pentagon/>.

⁶ Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, pp. 10-12 and Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, p. 10.

⁷ Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, pp. 27, 45.

⁸ Fontenot, et al, *US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, p. 24.

⁹ Address, President George Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," no date,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020129-11.html>.

¹⁰ Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, pp. 9-17; Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, pp. 30, 44-45; and News Story, Joe Burlas, subject: Shinseki pins on medals on Anaconda heroes, 10 Apr 02. Also see Charles Briscoe, Richard Kiper, James Schroder, and Kalev Sepp, *Weapons of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 03).

¹¹ Testimony, Statement of Lieutenant General James Helmly Before the Subcommittee On Defense, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, National Guard and Reserve Programs, 7 May 03.

¹² News Release, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism," Apr 04,

<http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php>; Photo caption, "Cpl. Dominic M. Pileri, *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 27; and Article, no author, "Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 18.

¹³ Article, no author, "The Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, pp. 19-20 and Photograph, *New York Newsday*, 8 Feb 02, <http://www.neynesday.com>.

¹⁴ Fontenot, et al., *US Army Operations in Iraqi Freedom*, p. xxii and Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, p. 27.

¹⁵ Address, President George Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, 10 Sep 02,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html>.

¹⁶ Statement, *The National Security Strategy of the United State of America*, 17 Sep 02; Article, anonymous, subject: "Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine," no date,

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html>; Article, anonymous, "Chronology," no date,

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lonroad/etc/cron.html>; and Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degan and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom: ON POINT* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 04), p. 23.

¹⁷ Study, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pierett, subject: Outline of Mobilization-Draft, p.1, 21 Jan 05 and General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (Harper Collins: New York, 04), p. 366.

¹⁸ Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, pp. 27-29.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 29-30.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 31 and Article, author unknown, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology, May 03,

http://www.ausa.org/www/army_mag.nsf.

²¹ Fontenot, et al., *US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, pp. 72-73, 91.

²² Email, Sergeant First Class Charron Jones, USARC G-3 to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, subject: Mobilizations Stats, 8 Feb 05.

²³ Battle Update Brief, USARC G-3, subject: Mobilization of Army Reserve Units and Soldiers, 30 Dec 03. This is the total Headquarters, Department of the Army mobilized Army Reserve Soldiers. There are discrepancies in the number of mobilized soldiers according to different sources. Email, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Davidson to Dr. Coker, USARC G-1, subject: Data for Historian, 27 Apr 05. According to the USARC's G-1 there were 53,555 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized. This is the number of Soldiers who were actually being paid. Email, Colonel James Shoenhard to Dr. Coker, subject: Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom RC Daily Update, 2 Mar 05. According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, which obtains its statistics from the G-3, the number was 89,629. That figure represents mobilization authorization -- how many members a unit is authorized to be mobilized for a given event. It does not represent people directly.

²⁴ Interview with Lieutenant General James Helmly by Dr. Coker, 11 Mar 04.

²⁵ News Release, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism," Apr 04,

<http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php>.

²⁶ Article, Michelle Tan, "'Warrior citizen', New Reserve chief thrives on 'intensity' of Army Life," *Army Times*, 26 Jun 06, p.23.

²⁷ Article, Kathleen Rhem, "President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq," 2 May 03.

<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771>.

²⁸ Email, Ms. Rebecca Robins Raines to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, subject: MP Unit History, 23 Feb 07. According to Ms. Raines, Chief of the Force Structure and Unit History Branch at the Center of Military History, the unit has never had a lineage prepared and the files are missing some of the relevant information. She provided this information from what is available.

²⁹ Pamphlet, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Headquarters, US Army Criminal Investigation Command, subject: The USACIDC Crest and Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, Oct 97. Soldiers wore the CID crest and shoulder sleeve insignia.

³⁰ Heraldry, subject: 733d Military Police Battalion, US Army Institute of Heraldry, Mar 07.

³¹ Historical Narrative, author unknown, subject; 733rd Military Police Battalion (CID), no date and Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Russell, subject: 733rd Military Police Battalion (CID) (TSE) Historical Report, 10 Apr 05, unit history file, Global War on Terrorism Collection (GWOTC), US Army Reserve Historical Research Collection (USARHRC), Office of Army Reserve History (OARH), US Army Reserve Command (USARC). Unless otherwise stated, all information is from the unit history file, GWOTC, USARHRC, OARH, USARC.

³² Permanent Orders 062-27, Headquarters First United States Army, subject: Mobilization in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom, 3 Mar 03.

³³ Permanent Orders C0228, Headquarters, United States Army Infantry Center, subject: OCONUS Deployment in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom, 17 Mar 03.

³⁴ Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Gillis, subject: Validation Letter for the 733 MP BN CID TSE HHC (WQ7GAA), 8 Apr 03.

³⁵ Message, Department of the Army, subject: DA Demob Order 102-04 ONE/OEF/OIF, 13 Jan 04.

³⁶ Memorandum for Commander, 3d Military Police Group (CID), Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Russell, subject: After Action Report, 9 Feb 04.

³⁷ History Narrative, <http://www.cid.army.mil/history.htm>, subject: Criminal Investigation Command, no date.

³⁸ Website home page, <http://www.cid.army.mil/701st.htm>, subject: 701st Military Police Group (CID), no date. A Protective Services battalion provides personal security services, much like the US Secret Service, for key Department of Defense and Department of the Army officials wherever they travel around the world. The battalion also provides security to certain foreign dignitaries visiting the United States.

³⁹ Historical Narrative, author unknown, subject; 733rd Military Police Battalion (CID), no date.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ The designation as detachments is indicative of the mobile, or transferable, nature of Army Reserve units; they can be detached at any time from the parent unit and assigned to whatever units need them, or to operate independently.

⁴² Telephone Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Russell with Mr. Dennis Hatcher, subject: Personal Recollections, 20 Feb 07.

⁴³ Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Gillis, subject: Training Certification Memorandum for the 733rd MP (WQ7GAA), 2 Apr 03.

⁴⁴ Telephone Interview, Russell with Hatcher, subject: Personal Experiences, 20 Feb 07.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle also called “HUMMER” or “HUMVEE” in military vernacular.

⁴⁷Telephone Interview, Russell with Hatcher, subject: Personal Recollections, 20 Feb 07.

⁴⁸Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Russell, subject: 733rd Military Police Battalion (CID) (TSE) Unit Historical Report, 10 Apr 04.

⁴⁹Telephone Interview, Russell with Hatcher, subject: Personal Reflections, 20 Feb 07.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Telephone Interview, Command Sergeant Major Wade F. Gordon III with Hatcher, subject: Personal Recollections, 21 Feb 07.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Message, Department of the Army, subject: DA Demob Order 102-04 ONE/OEF/OIF, 13 Jan 04

⁵⁴Memorandum for Commander, 3d Military Police Group, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Russell, subject: After Action Report, 9 Feb 04.

⁵⁵Telephone Interview, Russell with Mr. Dennis Hatcher, subject: Personal Recollections, 20 Feb 07.

⁵⁶Telephone Interview, Gordon, III with Hatcher, subject: Personal Recollections, 21 Feb 07.

⁵⁷Ibid.